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I. INTRODUCTION
Adoption has evolved from a process designed to provide an heir to
childless persons of means to a child-centered process in which the
predominant concern is meeting the need of a child to have a nurtur-
ing family. This evolution has resulted in reevaluation, and some-
times reform, of laws designed to prevent adoptive placement across
state lines. Where there are too few adoptive homes in a state, the
desirability of placing a child in a suitable home in another state has
been recognized. Interstate adoption is now encouraged by social
work standards and, to a lesser extent, by the Interstate Compact on
the Placement of Children ("ICPC")1, which has been enacted into
law in nearly all states.
The purpose of this Article is to consider the effect of the ICPC on
interstate adoption. The ICPC was intended to facilitate interstate
adoption, thereby increasing the pool of acceptable homes for children
in need of placement. The ICPC should make interstate adoption eas-
ier and more certain. In other words, the ICPC should make inter-
state adoption as much like intrastate adoption as possible, while fully
protecting the interests of the children to be placed. The thesis of this
Article is that, while the provisions of the ICPC address many of the
problems common to interstate adoption, a number of problems re-
main. Some of these problems have been resolved differently by the
courts of various states. These conflicting decisions undermine the
uniformity the ICPC was designed to achieve. Other problems oper-
ate as impediments to otherwise desirable interstate adoptions.
One external problem that impairs the effectiveness of the ICPC is
lack of awareness of its existence, resulting in widespread noncompli-
ance with its terms. Other problems include ambiguity in the defini-
tional section, underinclusiveness in the conditions for placement, and
the lack of adequate remedies for violations. This Article discusses
1. The INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN (Am. Pub. Welfare
Ass'n) [hereinafter the ICPC] has been enacted in identical form in 49 states and
the Virgin Islands. The full text of the ICPC is contained in the appendix. In
these footnotes, citation to the ICPC is by article number. The ICPC also applies
to most interstate placements for foster care, which are beyond the scope of this
Article.
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these problems, and then offers some suggestions for rethinking the
content and implementation of the ICPC.
II. BACKGROUND: INTERSTATE COMPACTS GENERALLY
An interstate compact is an agreement between states that is both
a contract binding the party states and a statute enacted by the legisla-
ture of each party state.2 A compact has been described as an inter-
state agreement involving "formal interstate activity."3 In contrast,
interstate associations, which engage in "informal cooperative activi-
ties," such as uniform laws, "are often the product of informal inter-
state cooperation without federal participation." 4 According to this
model, a compact may allocate decision competence to perform the
functions of intelligence ("the gathering, processing and disseminating
of information"), promotion ("agitation for the adoption of certain
preferred policies as 'prescriptions' or as law"), and prescription ("the
adoption of policies as authoritative or as law").5 Thus, some compacts
are agreements to investigate and discuss shared problems, while
others are agreements to act in a uniform manner to resolve those
problems.6
The use of compacts in America predates the Constitution and the
concept of statehood.7 The drafters of the Constitution included au-
thorization for these agreements in the "compact clause," which pro-
vides in part that "[n]o State shall, without the Consent of Congress
* . . enter into any Agreement Or Compact with another State, or with
a foreign power."s This consent of Congress requirement has been
held to apply only to those compacts that encroach upon federal pow-
ers.9 Thus, compacts that do not expand state powers vis-a-vis the fed-
eral government, such as those dealing with traditional state concerns,
do not require congressional approval.1o
The ICPC is an example of a compact that deals with a traditional
2. F. ZIMMERMAN & M. WENDELL, THE LAW AND USE OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS 1, 2
(1976). Some compacts have provided for interim approval by the governors of
states, followed by legislative approval within a specified period of time. See, e.g.,
M. RIDGEWAY, INTERSTATE COMPACTS: A QUESTION OF FEDERALISM 42 (1971).
3. Reisman & Simson, Interstate Agreements in the American Federal System, 27
RUTGERS L. REV. 70, 81-82 (1973).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 73.
6. Id. at 81.
7. P. HARDY, INTERSTATE COMPACTS: THE TIES THAT BIND 3-4 (1982). Nine com-
pacts were catalogued during the colonial period, four under the Articles of Con-
federation. Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A
Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685, app. at 730-34 (1925).
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
9. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893).
10. Id. See also United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452
(1978).
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state concern--child welfare. As such, it does not require congres-
sional approval.11 It should be noted, however, that the ICPC provides
that the government of Canada or a Canadian province may join with
the consent of Congress. 12 To date, congressional consent has not
been sought to permit Canadian participation.13
III. ORIGIN OF THE ICPC: IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEMS
IN INTERSTATE ADOPTION
The impetus for the development of the ICPC came from an infor-
mal group of social service administrators on the East Coast in the
1950s.14 Their study of the problems of interstate placement for foster
care and adoption led them to identify several concerns: (1) the failure
of importation and exportation statutes to provide protection for chil-
dren moved interstate; (2) the territorial limitation of a state's juris-
diction and the powerlessness of the state from which the child was
sent to ensure that proper care and supervision were provided in an-
other state; and (3) the absence of a means to compel the state to
which the child was sent to provide services in support of the place-
ment.' 5 In response to those concerns, the ICPC was drafted under
the auspices of the New York State Legislative Committee on Inter-
state Cooperation and was approved by a twelve-state conference in
1960.16 In the same year, New York became the first state to enact its
provisions.17 Since that time, forty-eight additional states and the Vir-
gin Islands have adopted the ICPC.J8 The ICPC has not been adopted
in New Jersey, the District of Columbia, or Puerto Rico.19
11. See P. HARDY, supra note 7, at 16; F. ZIMMERMAN & M. WENDELL, supra note 2, at
24.
12. ICPC, supra note 1, at art. IX.
13. AMERICAN PUBLIC WELFARE ASSOCIATION, THE INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE
PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN: COMPACT ADMINISTRATORS' MANUAL 2.12 (Compact
Provisions, An Interpretative Commentary) (1982) [hereinafter COMPACT ADMIN-
ISTRATORS' MANUAL].
14. THE SECRErARIAT TO THE ASSOCIATION OF ADMINISTRATORS OF THE INTERSTATE
COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN, GUIDE TO THE INTERSTATE COMPACT
ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN 3 (1985) [hereinafter GUIDE TO THE INTERSTATE
COMPACT].
15. Id.
16. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION PROGRAM FOR
1961 49 (1960). The draftsman of the ICPC was Dr. Mitchell Wendell, Research
Consultant to the New York Joint Legislative Committee on Interstate Coopera-
tion. R. HUNT, OBSTACLES TO INTERSTATE ADOPTION app. IV, part 3, at 44
(Draftsman's Notes, ICPC) (1972).
17. GUIDE TO THE INTERSTATE COMPACT, supra note 14, at 3.
18. COMPACT ADMINISTRATORS' MANUAL, supra note 13, at 5.00 (List of States in the
Compact).
19. Telephone interview with Betsey Rosenbaum, Project Manager, Secretariat to
the Association of Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the Placenent of
Children, American Public Welfare Association (Feb. 16, 1988).
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In recommending the enactment of the ICPC to state legislatures
in 1960, the Council of State Governments described the problems as
follows:
At the present time, laws relating to interstate placement are inadequate
or nonexistent. A number of states have interstate placement statutes, but
they have been enacted unilaterally. Consequently, supervision of the out-of-
state source from which a child may be sent into the jurisdiction is difficult or
impossible. When the state having a placement law is the originating point for
the child, no legally binding control may be exercised once the placement has
been made, unless a really bad situation develops in the other state, is discov-
ered by its welfare authorities, and is treated as a new case needing corrective
action on a wholly local basis. Some states, either with or without placement
laws, have informal arrangements for courtesy supervision of homes in which
interstate placements are made. However, the state of origin loses jurisdiction
over the child once it has left the state and, if the voluntary arrangements
break down or are resisted, undesirable situations can develop.
2 0
The problems identified in the paragraph quoted above are manifesta-
tions of the limited jurisdictional reach of a state, which, despite the
full faith and credit clause, can neither direct the care nor compel the
return of a child beyond its borders. To invoke full faith and credit,
the state of origin must have "jurisdiction over both the parties and
the subject matter at the time it must act."'21 The ICPC was intended
to extend the jurisdictional reach of a party state into the borders of
another party state for the purpose of investigating a proposed place-
ment and supervising a placement once it has been made.2
2
IV. PURPOSE AND POLICY OF THE ICPC: ARTICLE I
The statement of purpose and policy indicates that the ICPC was
designed to accomplish four objectives: (1) maximization of opportu-
nity for placement; (2) maximization of information for the receiving;
(3) maximization of information for the state from which the child is
sent; and (4) resolution of jurisdictional conflicts.23 Each of these
objectives addresses genuine problems that can and do occur in inter-
state placements.
Paragraph (a) of Article I addresses the problem that occurs when
there is a shortage of available placements for children in a particular
state.2 4 Article I(a) calls for maximization of opportunity for desirable
placement by removing the limitations ordinarily imposed by state
boundaries, thereby expanding the pool of potential placements. This
clearly indicates that the ICPC was intended to facilitate "good" place-
20. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION PROGRAM FOR
1961, 49 (1960).
21. Callanan & Wendell, The Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, 26
Juv. JUST. 41, 42 (May 1975).
22. ICPC, supra note 1, at art. I(c), (d).
23. ICPC, supra note 1, at art. I.
24. COMPACT ADMINISTRATORS' MANUAL, supra note 13, at 1.00 (Introduction).
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ments, that is, placements which serve the best interests of the chil-
dren, whether interstate or intrastate. In maximizing the opportunity
for adoptive placement, the ICPC should serve to neutralize the effect
that crossing state lines would otherwise have on the placement deci-
sion. The decisionmaker is then able to focus on the child's needs, not
jurisdictional conundrums.
Paragraphs (b) and (c) of Article I address problems associated
with the need to have sufficient knowledge to evaluate a proposed in-
terstate placement before it occurs. A problem is created when a child
is placed in a state without the knowledge of the authorities in that
state, such as child welfare agencies or courts, who bear, or who may
ultimately bear, responsibility for the child's well-being. Without
prior knowledge of the placement, there is no opportunity to safe-
guard the interests of the child by assuring compliance with that
state's child placement laws.25
A similar problem exists from the perspective of a party charged
with legal responsibility for the child in the sending state. The re-
sponsible party could be an individual, an agency, or a court. The re-
sponsibility to protect the interests of the child cannot be discharged
properly when the responsible party is incapable of conducting a full
investigation because the information sought is beyond the sending
state's territorial reach.26
Finally, paragraph (d) of Article I addresses the many problems
related to jurisdictional conflicts regarding the supervision of and fi-
nancial responsibility for interstate placements. These problems in-
clude the potential loss of jurisdiction over a child placed out of state,
the inability to supervise a placement in another state, and the risk of
shifting the financial responsibility to the receiving state.27
V. SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS OF THE ICPC
The text of the ICPC consists of ten articles, which are identical in
all member states.28 In addition to the text of the ICPC, there is also
suggested enabling legislation to "put the compact into effect and to
relate its provisions to the organizational structure and operating pro-
cedure of the ratifying state."29 The suggested enabling act has been
adopted by all party states in substantially the same form as
recommended.SO
25. See Oney, Legal Aspects of Interstate Adoptions, 38 J. Mo. B. 428, 428-29 (1982).
26. Id
27. COMPACT AD.INISTRATORS' MANUAL, supra note 13, at 1.02. Issues of financial
responsibility relating to subsidized and special needs adoption have been ad-
dressed in the INTERSTATE COMPACT ON ADOPTION AND MEDICAL ASSISTANCE.
28. COMPAcT ADMINISTRATORS' MANUAL, supra note 13, at 2.1.
29. Id. at 1.08.
30. Id.
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In essence, the ICPC requires that its procedures be followed in
order to obtain the receiving state's permission for placement before
the child is sent to the receiving state for purposes of foster care or
adoption. Thus, the ICPC requires prospective, rather than retroac-
tive, compliance. Articles II through X are briefly summarized below.
A. Article II: Definitions
Article II defines four key terms: "child," "sending agency," "re-
ceiving state," and "placement."3 1 "Child" is defined as "a person
who, by reason of minority, is legally subject to parental, guardianship
or similar control." 32 "Sending agency" is defined to include an officer
or employee of a party state or one of its subdivisions, a court of a
party state, a private agency, an individual, corporation, association or
other entity which sends, brings, or causes to be sent or brought any
child to another party state.33 "Receiving state" is defined as "the
state to which a child is sent, brought, or caused to be sent or brought,
whether by public authorities or private persons or agencies, and
whether for placement with private agencies or persons."3 4 Finally,
"placement" is defined as "the arrangement for the care of a child in a
family free or boarding home or in a child-caring agency or institu-
tion," excluding mental institutions, educational institutions, and
medical facilities.35 "Family free" home is not defined in the ICPC.
Apparently, it means a family home in which a child lives without
charge and is provided "the care which children usually receive from
their parents as part of the process of upbringing."3 s A "family free"
home may be contrasted with a boarding home in which a child lives
in exchange for compensation to the substitute parents.
B. Article III: Conditions for Placement
Article III sets out four general requirements for a valid place-
ment. First, paragraph (a) prohibits a sending agency from sending,
bringing, or causing "to be sent or brought into any other party state
any child for placement in foster care or as a preliminary to a possible
adoption unless" the provisions of Article III and the placement laws
of the receiving state are met.37 Second, a sending agency must pro-
31. The term "sending state" is not defined by the ICPC. See infra notes 119-22 and
accompanying text. However, for stylistic purposes, the term "sending state" is
often used throughout this Article as if it were actually defined.
32. ICPC, supra note 1, at art. II(a).
33. ICPC, supra note 1, at art. II(b).
34. ICPC, supra note 1, at art. II(c).
35. ICPC, supra note 1, at art. II(d).
36. COMPACT ADMINISTRATORS' MANUAL, supra note 13, at 2.2 (Compact Provisions,
An Interpretive Commentary).
37. ICPC, supra note 1, at art. III(a).
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vide written notice of the proposed placement to the receiving state.3 8
The written notice must include identifying information about the
- child, the child's parents or guardians, and the person, agency, or insti-
tution with whom the child is to be placed.3 9 Additionally, the notice
must contain a statement of reasons for the proposed placement and
"evidence of the authority pursuant to which the placement is pro-
posed to be made."40 Third, an appropriate officer of the sending
state, agency of the sending state, or the sending agency itself may be
required to provide any additional information requested by the re-
ceiving state.4 1 Finally, the child cannot be "sent, brought, or caused
to be sent or brought into the receiving state" until the receiving state
notifies the sending agency in writing that "the proposed placement
does not appear to be contrary to the best interests of the child."42
C. Article IV: Penalties
Article IV prescribes two kinds of penalties for a placement made
in violation of the ICPC. First, the violation of the ICPC is deemed a
violation of the child placement laws of both the sending and receiving
states ,and may be punished as such in either state.43 Second, the
ICPC violation constitutes grounds for the suspension or revocation of
a license to place or care for children.44
D. Article V: Jurisdiction
Article V provides that jurisdiction over a child placed in another
state is retained by the sending agency to direct the child's custody and
care.45 The sending agency retains the same degree of control over,
and responsibility for, the child as "if the child had remained in the
sending agency's state."46 Additionally, Article V provides that the
sending agency remains financially responsible for the support and
maintenance of the child during the period of placement.47 However,
Article V provides an exception to the retention of jurisdiction by the
sending agency when a child commits a crime or a delinquent act in
the receiving state. Then the receiving state has jurisdiction "suffi-
38. ICPC, supra note 1, at art. III(b).
39. ICPC, supra note 1, at art. III(b)(1)-(3).
40. ICPC, supra note 1, at art. III(b)(4).
41. 1CPC, supra note 1, at art. III(c).
42. ICPC, supra note 1, at art. III(d).
43. ICPC, supra note 1, at art. IV.
44. Id.
45. ICPC, supra note 1, at art. V(a).
46. Id. The relationship between the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and the
ICPC is beyond the scope of this Article; however, where the sending agency is a
court, a conflict of laws problem may exist.
47. ICPC, supra note 1, at art. V(a).
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cient to deal with [the] act of delinquency or crime."48
Article V also permits a sending agency that is either a public
agency or a private charitable agency to arrange for an authorized
agency in the receiving state to provide services on its behalf or to act
as its agent in regard to a placement.49 However, this provision for
services or financial support by an agency in the receiving state does
not relieve the sending agency from its responsibilities under Article
V.50
E. Article VI: Delinquent Children
Article VI provides for the placement of a delinquent child in an
institution in another state.5 ' The purpose of Article VI was to fill a
gap left by the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Juveniles,
which appeared to prohibit out-of-state placement of juvenile delin-
quents in private institutions.5 2 However, that topic is beyond the pur-
view of this Article.
F. Article VII: Compact Administrator
Article VII provides for the designation of an officer of the state to
act as compact administrator with the responsibility of coordinating
ICPC activities and, jointly with the other compact administrators,
promulgating rules and regulations. 53
G. Article VIII: Limitations
The applicability of the ICPC is limited by two provisions in Arti-
cle VIII. Paragraph (a) of Article VIII exempts placements made by a
close relative or a guardian with a close relative or non-agency guard-
ian.54 Paragraph (b) of Article VIII exempts placements made pursu-
ant to another interstate compact or similar agreement between
states.55
H. Article IX: Participation
Article IX provides that the ICPC may be joined "by any state,
territory or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia,
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and, with the consent of Congress,
48. Id.
49. ICPC, supra note 1, at art. V(b), (c).
50. ICPC, supra note 1, at art. V(c).
51. ICPC, supra note 1, at art. VI.
52. Callanan & Wendell, supra note 21, at 43.
53. ICPC, supra note 1, at art. VII. See infra text accompanying notes 61-64.
54. ICPC, supra note 1, at art. VIII(a). See infra text accompanying notes 123-127.
55. The Interstate Compact on Juveniles is an example of a compact with the poten-
tial for overlapping coverage with the ICPC.
[Vol. 68:292
INTERSTATE COMPACT
the Government of Canada or any province thereof."5 6 Thus, in most
cases, the ICPC may be joined by enacting its provisions into law.57
Article IX also provides for withdrawal from the ICPC by the enact-
ment of a statute. However, such withdrawal cannot take effect for
two years, and notice of the withdrawal must be given to all other
party states.5 8
I. Article X: Construction and Severability
Finally, Article X mandates liberal construction and severability of
ICPC provisions.5 9 Article X has been described as "a standard com-
pact provision" intended to address improbable constitutional chal-
lenges to the ICPC.60
VI. ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE AND OPERATION
OF THE ICPC
Pursuant to Article VII, each state that is a party to the ICPC has a
compact administrator who is charged with the responsibility of coor-
dinating ICPC activities within that state. The compact administra-
tors of all the member states are authorized by Article VII to jointly
issue rules and regulations. To that end, the Association of Adminis-
trators of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children ("As-
sociation of Administrators") was established.61 The Association of
Administrators is affiliated with the American Public Welfare Associ-
ation, which provides the Secretariat for the Association of Adminis-
trators ("Secretariat"). The Secretariat performs certain coordinating
functions on a national level, including record keeping, the compila-
tion and dissemination of data, the maintenance of the Compact Ad-
ministrators' Manual, technical assistance, and other duties as
contracted with by the Association of Administrators. 62 One of the
other functions of the Secretariat is to furnish advisory opinions to
compact administrators. Those opinions are then included in the
Compact Administrators' Manual.63 Although Secretariat Opinions
do not have the force of law, they are often cited by courts as persua-
sive authority in ICPC matters.64
56. ICPC, supra note 1, at art. IX.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. ICPC, supra note 1, at art. X.
60. COMPACT ADMINISTRATOR'S MANUAL, supr note 13, at 2.12 (Compact Provisions,
An Interpretative Commentary).
61. Id. at 4.1.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 3.1.
64. H. GITLIN, ADOPTIONS: AN ATTORNEY's GUIDE TO HELPING ADOPTIVE PARENTS
116 (1987).
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VII. BARRIERS TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ICPC
A. ICPC Often Violated Both Unintentionally and Intentionally
A major barrier to the effectiveness of the ICPC is lack of compli-
ance with its terms. Courts have noted the magnitude of this problem
of noncompliance,65 and the Secretariat has acknowledged that "it
often happens, through inadvertence or otherwise that children are
placed from one Compact state into another without observing Com-
pact procedures." 66 Although the Secretariat Opinion quoted is more
than twelve years old, the problem of noncompliance continues and
was noted recently in a 1987 opinion of the New York Surrogate's
Court.67
1. Unintentional Noncompliance
In some instances noncompliance is unintentional. Many persons,
including attorneys, who are inexperienced in interstate adoptions are
simply unaware of the existence of the ICPC and its provisions.68 An
attorney or layman who reads the requirements for an adoption as
provided in statutes labelled "adoption" and who consults the index to
state statutes for other provisions relating to adoption, is unlikely to
discover that the state is a party to the ICPC.69 The reasons for this
are simple. The ICPC is not codified as part of the adoption statutes,7 0
most state adoption statutes do not cross-reference the ICPC provi-
sions,71 and nearly half of the indices to state codes do not refer to the
ICPC provisions under the headings "adoption" or "interstate adop-
tion."72 While most of the indices do refer to the ICPC under the
65. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Baby "E", 104 Misc. 2d 185, 427 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Farn. Ct.
1980).
66. COMPACT ADMINISTRATORS' MANUAL, supra note 13, at 3.27 (Secretariat Opinion
16 (May 16, 1975)).
67. In re Adoption of Baby Boy M.G. Anonymous, 135 Misc. 2d 252, 515 N.Y.S.2d 198
(Sur. Ct. 1987).
68. H. GITLIN, supra note 64, at 112. Some legal commentators and jurists also appear
to be unaware of the ICPC. The author of a recent student note on independent
adoption wrote about the problems of interstate placement without mentioning
the ICPC. The note proposed the enactment of a model statute which incorpo-
rated ICPC-provisions without indicating, or perhaps recognizing, that those pro-
visions are law in the 49 states that are ICPC members. Note, Independent
Adoption: The Inadequacies of State Law, 63 WASH. U.L.Q. 753 (1986). A recent
Kentucky decision suggests that some judges are also unaware of the ICPC. In
Waters v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 736 S.W.2d 365 (Ky. App. 1987), the trial
court attempted to apply the Interstate Compact on Juveniles where the ICPC
was clearly applicable.
69. H. GITLIN, supra note 64, at 112.
70. Id.
71. Apparently, no adoption statutes cross-reference the ICPC.
72. The ICPC is indexed under "adoption" or "interstate adoption" in only 27 of the
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headings "compact" or "interstate compact," one would need to know
of the existence of the ICPC to take advantage of those entries.
Unintentional noncompliance may also occur due to uncertainty as
to whether the ICPC applies in a particular case. For example, a send-
ing agency may resolve a question of the ICPC's applicability in a dif-
ferent manner than a compact administrator, and both may have
substantial arguments in favor of their positions. While some of this
uncertainty is the result of the impossibility of drafting a statute to
cover all possible fact situations, some of this uncertainty is also the
result of ambiguity in the definitional sections of the ICPC.73 This
unintentional noncompliance due to uncertainty is ordinarily ad-
dressed in one of two ways: by retroactive compliance or by litigation.
When litigation is chosen, even if the litigation proceeds to the
highest state court, the uncertainty is resolved only in that jurisdic-
tion. The same uncertainty may arise in the courts of another party
state and may be resolved in a conflicting manner because the doctrine
of stare decisis is inapplicable. Thus, an individual seeking to deter-
mine whether the ICPC applies in a particular jurisdiction which has
no binding precedent is faced with uncertainty and the opportunity to
argue for the interpretation that is consistent with the desired result.
The problem is the same as that with the interpretation of any uni-
form act by various state courts-the desired uniformity may be lost if
conflicting judicial interpretations are rendered.
2. Noncompliance with the ICPC in Independent Adoptions
Reported cases indicate that the problem of noncompliance is a sig-
nificant one, particularly in those adoptions labelled "independent,"
"private," or "gray market" adoptions.74 An independent, private, or
gray market adoption is one in which the birth parents relinquish the
child for adoption without the involvement of a licensed adoption
agency.75 The placement is made by the birth parents themselves or
by an intermediary. The private adoption nomenclature is somewhat
confusing because an adoption agency can be either public or private.7 6
However, a private adoption is one which involves neither a public nor
49 ICPC member states. In the remaining 22 member states, the ICPC is indexed
under various headings, including "minors" and "children."
73. See infra text accompanying notes 110-43.
74. See COMPACT ADMINISTRATORS' MANUAL, supra note 13, (Secretariat Opinion 16
(May 16, 1975)), at 3.27. See also, COMPACT ADMINISTRATORS' MANUAL, upra
note 13, at 3.71-3.72 (Secretariat Opinion 38 (April 7, 1977)).
75. Howe, Adoption Practice, Issues, and Laws 1958-1983, 17 FAM. L.Q. 173, 179
(1983); Comment, Independent Adoptions: Is the Black and White Beginning to
Appear in the Controversy Over Gray-Market Adoptions?, 18 DUQ. L. REv. 629,
630 (1980).
76. Comment, supra note 75, at 630 n.8.
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private adoption agency. Private adoptions are also referred to as "pri-
vate placements."
The term "gray market adoption" has been used to indicate that
independent adoptions often fall into a gray area of the law, some-
where between the highly regulated agency adoptions and the pa-
tently illegal baby selling of blackmarket adoptions.77 Some states
prohibit anyone other than a parent or legally recognized parent sub-
stitute from making an independent adoption placement.78 Other
states permit intermediaries to arrange an independent placement,
while imposing limitations on who may act as an intermediary and
what fees they may collect, if any.79
Although not involved in the placement, an agency may become
involved in an independent adoption by investigating the adoptive
home, either before or after the placement is made, as required by the
state's adoption statutes.8 0 Even in states that do not require it. an
agency investigation may be ordered in the discretion of the court
hearing the petition for adoption.S1
A frequent criticism of independent adoptions is that they fail to
protect the interests of the child because, in most states, the prospec-
tive adoptive home is not investigated by a licensed child placing
agency before the placement occurs.8 2 Once the placement occurs,
even if the post-placement investigation reveals deficiencies in the
prospective adoptive parents or in the home environment, removal of
the child is unlikely unless the deficiencies are severe.83 Thus, it has
been argued that the child is deprived of the best available placement
to which he or she is entitled by the best interests standard which
governs adoption.84 Under this view, independent adoption allows a
child to be placed with the highest bidder, rather than with the adop-
tive parents best able to fulfill all the child's needs--emotional as well
as material.8 5
Another criticism of independent adoption is that it fails to ade-
quately protect the interests of the adoptive and birth parents. On the
other hand, supporters of independent adoption dispute the notion
77. Id. at 629-30.
78. Id. at 637.
79. Note, supra note 68, at 756-57.
80. Id. at 758-59.
81. Id. at 758 n.48.
82. Comment, supra note 75, at 633-34. An interstate independent adoption place-
ment, made in compliance with the ICPC, will ordinarily involve a pre-placement
investigation as a prerequisite to ICPC approval.
83. See W. MEEZAN, S. KATz & E. Russo, ADOPTIONS WITHOUT AGENCIES 27 (1978).
84. See generally id. See also Podolski, Abolishing Baby Buying: Limiting Independ-
ent Adoption Placement, 9 FAM. L.Q. 547, 551-52 (1975).
85. C.f, Comment, supra note 75, at 646 (noting the concern that less affluent pro-
spective adoptive parents might be disadvantaged in the competition for healthy
white infants).
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that independent placements create greater risks for the child86 and
cite a number of advantages to the child.87 Independent adoption
often permits direct placement of a newborn with the adoptive parents
within a few days of birth.88 This is advantageous because the bonding
process can begin immediately between parents and child.89 In-
dependent adoption is also advantageous in that the child need not be
placed in a foster home, only to have that relationship disrupted when
the adoption placement occurs.9 0 Further, independent adoptions are
frequently, though not necessarily, more "open" than agency adop-
tions, allowing the birth parents and adoptive parents to know one
another's identities and even to meet, should they desire.91 This addi-
tional information may be beneficial to the adoptive child in coming to
grips with having been adopted and in. reconciling his or her genetic
and social identities.9 2
The parties to an interstate independent adoption might inadver-
tently fail to comply with the ICPC for the reasons discussed in sec-
tion VII(A) of this Article, or they might knowingly choose not to
comply with the provisions of the ICPC for several reasons. First, one
of the states might prohibit or impose greater restrictions on in-
dependent placements.93 Second, complying with the ICPC may be
time consuming, and time may be of the essence if placement of the
infant with the adoptive parents directly from the hospital is desired.
Third, the penalties for noncompliance may be insufficient to deter
intentional noncompliance with the ICPC provisions by the parties to
86. Leavitt, The Model Adoption Act Return to a Balanced View of Adoption, 19
FAM. L.Q. 141, 149 (1985). The most recent comprehensive treatment of in-
dependent adoptions appears in W. Meezan, S. Katz, and E. Russo's work, supra
note 83, in which the authors concluded:
[The majority of the homes in which children were placed indepen-
dently were rated by the agencies as being as good or better than agency
homes in their physical and emotional care of the child... and almost all
of the homes were rated positively by the trained personnel who inter-
viewed the adoptive couple.
Leavitt, supra, at 149.
87. See generally id. at 141-54.
88. Id. at 149; Comment, supra note 75, at 647; Note, Independent Adoptions: Regu-
lating the Middleman, 24 WASHBURN L.J. 327, 334 (1985).
89. CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, STANDARDS FOR ADOPTION SERVICE 37
(Rev. 1978).
90. Comment, supra note 75, at 644. Most agencies do not place infants with adoptive
families until the parental rights of the birth parents have been terminated or
relinquished. Note, supra note 88, at 334.
91. Some of the negative aspects of open adoption with extensive interaction between
the birth and adoptive families are discussed in J. SMITH & F. MIROFF, YOU'RE
OUR CHILD: THE ADOPTION EXPERIENCE 6-8 (1987) and in Schur, The ABA Model
State Adoption Act. Observations from an Agency Perspective, 19 FAM. L.Q. 131,
132-33 (1985).
92. See Leavitt, supra note 86, at 78-79.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 78-79
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an independent adoption. 94
Consider, for example, a typical scenario involving ICPC party
States A and B. A pregnant woman who wishes to place her child for
adoption (birth mother) resides in State A, where independent place-
ments with nonrelatives are prohibited. If the birth mother prefers an
independent placement, she might contact an attorney or other inter-
mediary in State B, where independent placements are permitted.
The intermediary would identify a prospective adoptive family in
State B and begin to make arrangements for the adoption. To avoid
the appearance, if not the actuality, of an interstate adoption, the birth
mother might be advised to relocate to State B until the child is born
and relinquished to the adoptive parents. If the birth mother delivers
the child in State B, has a State B address, and relinquishes the child
to the adoptive parents in accordance with the laws of State B, there
may be no reason to suspect that an interstate adoption has occurred.
Indeed, some would argue that there has been no interstate adoption
under these facts.9 5 However, the position taken by the compact ad-
ministrators in both states is apt to be that an interstate placement has
occurred and that the ICPC has been violated.96
Whether the interstate aspect of the placement is discovered and
brought to the attention of the compact administrators or a court de-
pends upon the type of investigation that State B conducts prior to
finalization of the adoption. This discovery is most likely in a jurisdic-
tion that requires interviews with the birth parents and an investiga-
tion of the adoptive home, less- likely in a jurisdiction that mandates
an investigation of the adoptive home only, and unlikely in a jurisdic-
tion that does not require an investigation at alI.97
If the interstate nature of the placement is discovered, the court
has three options (assuming the adoption is otherwise in the best in-
terests of the child): (1) grant the petition to adopt without ICPC ap-
proval; (2) deny the petition to adopt; or (3) require retroactive
94. See infra text accompanying notes 156-83.
95. Kan. Op. Att'y Gen. 88-174 (Dec. 28, 1988), reprinted in 15 Faro. L. Rep. (BNA)
1243 (Mar. 21, 1989).
96. COMPACT ADMINISTRATORS' MANUAL, supra note 13, at 3.105 (Secretariat Opinion
49 (June 30, 1986)).
Where the expectant mother crosses a state line as part of the placement
plan and arrangement, the transaction should be viewed as an interstate
placement. In enacting the Compact, the intent of the state legislatures
was not to make the protections of placements depend on mechanical
manipulations of the delivery point. Such logistic calculations are noth-
ing more than subterfuges and studied efforts to avoid the intended and
normal consequences of the law.
Id. at 3.106. See also id. at 3.67-3.70 (Secretariat Opinion 37 (April 7, 1977)); id., at
3.71 (Secretariat Opinion 38 (April 7, 1977)).
97. Cf. Note, supra note 68, at 757-58 (discussing variations in the investigative
process).
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compliance with the ICPC. As discussed later in this Article, several
courts have upheld the finalization of adoptions without ICPC ap-
proval.98 Rarely has a court denied the petition to adopt and required
that the child be returned to the birth mother for failure to comply
with the ICPC.99 The option most frequently chosen by the courts,
with the apparent encouragement of the Secretariat, is retroactive
compliance.100
However, retroactive compliance undermines the purposes of the
ICPC in at least two ways. First, a post-placement investigation, rather
than a pre-placement investigation, may provide less protection for
the interests of the child; and second, the jurisdiction of State A over
the child has been subverted. Clearly, the child has received no less
protection than any State B child who is placed independently. How-
ever, it is arguable that the child has received less protection than a
State A child, and one of the goals of the ICPC is to prevent forum
shopping which might benefit the adopting parents, birth parents, or
intermediaries at the expense of the child.101 Nonetheless, retroac-
tive compliance may be the preferred alternative when the child has
been integrated into the adoptive family and would be adversely af-
fected by removal.lo 2
Even if the laws of States A and B were similar in permitting in-
dependent adoption, the parties might seek to circumvent the ICPC if
an imnmediate placement were desired. The length of time required to
obtain ICPC approval could negate the benefits of early bonding and
continuity associated with independent adoption. "Six weeks-30
working days-is the maximum recommended processing time from
98. See infra notes 171-182 and accompanying text.
99. See infra notes 164-170 and accompanying text.
100. See COMPACT ADMINISTRATORS' MANUAL, supra note 13, at 3.27 (Secretariat
Opinion 16 (May 16, 1975)).
In most instances it is desirable to cover [sic] the placement into the
Compact even though its initiation was improper. This can be done by
notifying the sending agency, the home ... in which the child is placed,
and the Compact Administrators in the sending and receiving states.
Appropriate documents can then be sent and approval given. Of course,
this should not be done if it is found that the environment into which the
child has been placed is not satisfactory.
Id. See also COMPAT ADMINISTRATORS' MANUAL, supra note 13, at 3.71-3.72 (Sec-
retariat Opinion 38 (April 7, 1977)).
101. ICPC, supra note 1, at art. I.
102. COMPAT ADMINIsTRATORs' MANuAL, supra note 13, at 3.27 (Secretariat Opinion
16 (May 16, 1975)).
If the placement is preliminary to a possible adoption, it would be possi-
ble for a court to refuse the final adoption decree on the ground that the
child was unlawfully in the adoptive home. However, if the placement is
otherwise satisfactory, and if it appears that the adoption is desirable, it
would be a severe remedy to impose. Moreover, the principal victim
probably would be the child.
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the date the receiving state Compact office receives the notice of the
proposed placement until the date that the placement is approved or
denied."os However, an average interstate placement delay of three
months has been reported in at least one location.104
If the parties agree to an independent placement well before the
birth of the child, an immediate placement in compliance with the
ICPC would be feasible, but improbable. The application for ICPC ap-
provals could be submitted in advance and the investigation of the
adoptive home could be completed.os However, final approval is un-
likely prior to the birth because proof of surrender of parental rights
is required, and, ordinarily, parental rights may not be surrendered
until after the birth of the child.10 6 Furthermore, in some states ap-
proval would take even longer because a judicial termination of paren-
tal rights is required.107 Thus, a placement approved by the ICPC
shortly after birth is difficult .to arrange even in the most advanta-
geous circumstances. In less advantageous circumstances, as where
the birth mother decides after she delivers to place the child for adop-
tion and the prospective adoptive parents reside in a state that re-
quires judicial termination of parental rights, an ICPC-approved
interstate placement within a few days of birth is virtually impossi-
ble. 0 8 However, in most jurisdictions that permit independent place-
ments, an intrastate placement is feasible within a few days of birth
because no prior approval is required.109
One might argue that the impediments to independent placement
created by the ICPC are desirable in that a hasty placement may fail
to protect the best interests of the child. However, if the placement is
likely to be made anyway, in contravention of the ICPC, and if the
penalties for noncompliance are unlikely to affect the finalization of
the adoption, it might be preferable to have a system that would, at a
minimum, encourage early notification of the authorities in the af-
fected states.
103. GUIDE TO THE INTERSTATE COMPACT, supra note 14, at 7.
104. Leavitt, supra note 86, at 150 (this estimate is attributed to the Los Angeles
County Counsel).
105. COMPACT ADMINISTRATORS' MANUAL, supra note 13, at 3.106-3.107 (Secretariat
Opinion 49 (June 30, 1986)).
106. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 878-79 (2d
ed. 1988).
107. Leavitt, supra note 86, at 150.
108. One possible exception would be the circumstance in which the prospective adop-
tive home had been investigated and the report of the investigation was accepta-
ble to the compact administrators.
109. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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B. Definitional Section Inadequate
1. Definition of Sending Agency Is Too Broad
A recurring problem has been determining who is a sending agency
for purposes of requiring compliance with ICPC provisions. Para-
graph (b) of Article II provides:
"Sending agency" means a party state, officer or employee thereof; a subdi-
vision of a party state, or officer or employee thereof; a court of a party state; a
person, corporation, association, charitable agency or other entity which
sends, brings, or causes to be sent or brought any child to another party
state.1 1 0
Thus, a sending agency need not be an agency, nor must it have sent a
child from one party state to another. The definition of sending
agency is broad enough to include any individual or entity, including a
parent 111 or a court, that causes a child to be moved interstate. In a
given placement arrangement, a number of individuals and agencies
could be deemed the sending agency. Furthermore, there is nothing in
the language of the ICPC to suggest that only one party to a placement
can be a sending agency. In addition to the obvious sending agency,
the parent or entity which places the child, the recipient of a child
may also be a sending agency if it causes a child to be brought or sent
from one party state to another party state.112 Indeed, the definition
of a sending agency is so broad that a party having custody of a child
for purposes of adoption who moves with the child from one party
state to another party state, before the adoption is finalized, may be a
sending agency."13 This issue of who is the sending agency has been
problematic in the few reported cases dealing with the ICPC and
adoption.1'4 The determination of who is the sending agency is para-
mount to all interstate adoption cases for two reasons. First, it is the
sending agency that must comply with the requirements of the ICPC
or be penalized for an illegal placement.135 Second, it is the sending
agency that retains jurisdiction over, and responsibility for, the child
until the adoption is finalized.116
While the broad definition of sending agency may be advantageous
because at least one of the "sending agencies" may be expected to seek
110. ICPC, supra note 1, at art. II(b).
111. It should be noted, however, that some parent-initiated placements are exempted
from the ICPC by Article VIII. See infra text accompanying notes 123-127.
112. In re Adoption of C.L.W., 467 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)(per curiam);
See In re Adoption of T.M.M., 186 Mont. 460, 608 P.2d 130 (1980).
113. Cf. COMPACT ADMINISTRATORS' MANUAL, supra note 13, at 1.20 (Regulation I).
114. See In re Adoption of C.L.W., 467 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)(per
curiam); In re Male Child Born July 15, 1985 to L.C., 718 P.2d 660 (Mont. 1986); In
re Adoption of T.M.M., 186 Mont. 460, 608 P.2d 130 (1980).
115. See ICPC, supra note 1, at art. III, IV. See also COMPACT ADMINISTRATORS' MAN-
UAL, supra note 13, at 2.2 (Compact Provisions, An Interpretive Commentary).
116. ICPC, supra note 1, at art. V.
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compliance with the ICPC, the existence of multiple sending agencies
might make private enforcement of the ICPC more difficult. In at
least one case, a natural mother who sought to use a violation of the
ICPC as the basis for blocking an adoption was unsuccessful due, in
part, to the fact that she, like the adoptive parents, was a sending
agency who had failed to comply with the ICPC.1 1 7 Thus, if all parties
to the transaction can be characterized as sending agencies and
charged equally with the responsibility of ICPC compliance, private
enforcement becomes improbable.
Even if the existence of multiple sending agencies has the desired
effect of increasing the likelihood of compliance, the question remains
whether the likelihood of compliance would be increased even more
by limiting the number of possible sending agencies and thereby facili-
tating additional private enforcement. The risk that one of the parties
to the adoption arrangement might block the adoption on the grounds
of noncompliance with the ICPC would interject a degree of uncer-
tainty into the adoption process. That uncertainty could make non-
compliance with the ICPC a far less attractive alternative to
prospective adoptive parents and their attorneys.1 18
2. Sending State Is Not Defined
The concept of the sending state was omitted from the definitional
section and from the overall scheme of the ICPC. A state may be a
sending agency as that term is defined, but the state's role remains
undefined if it is not the sending agency. This omission is cured some-
what by the implementing regulations adopted in most states n1 9 and
by the "Suggested Procedures" promulgated by the Secretariat.120
The regulations and the procedures provide that an application for
ICPC approval ("Interstate Compact Placement Request" Form
ICPC-100A) be submitted first to the compact administrator in the
sending agency's state. The sending state thus acquires a role in re-
ceiving the application and forwarding it to the compact administrator
in the receiving state. Only if the compact administi ator in the send-
ing state approves the proposed placement, and so indicates by signing
the Form ICPC-100A, will the application be forwarded to the receiv-
ing state's compact administrator for the approval required by Article
111.121 Because the role for the compact administrator was created by
117. In re Adoption of C.L.W., 467 So. 2d 1106, 1111 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)(per
curiam).
118. See infra text accompanying note 182.
119. GUIDE TO THE INTERSTATE COMPACT, supra note 14, at 6.
120. COMPACT ADMINISTRATORS' MANUAL, supra note 13, at 1.40.
121. COMPACT ADMINISTRATORS' MANUAL, supra note 13, at 1.42 (the portion of the
form which provides a space for the sending state compact administrator's signa-
ture is entitled "Services Requested" and does not specifically indicate sending
state approval of the proposed placement).
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the adoption of procedures and not by the terms of the ICPC, there is
no provision in the ICPC to indicate the basis upon which an applica-
tion may be approved or denied by the compact administrator in the
sending state. The compact administrator in the receiving state is re-
quired to make a determination "that the proposed placement does
not appear, to be contrary to the best interests of the child."122 Pre-
sumably the same criterion would guide the determination by the
compact administrator in the sending state.
3. Guardian and Non-Agency Guardian Are Not Defined
While the definition of sending agency is expansive enough to in-
clude a parent who sends or brings a child to another state for adop-
tive placement, Article VIII of the ICPC exempts from its reach some
placements initiated by a parent, relative, or guardian:
This compact shall not apply to: (a) The sending or bringing of a child into a
receiving state by his parent, step-parent, grandparent, adult brother or sister,
adult uncle or aunt, or his guardian and leaving the child with any such rela-
tive or non-agency guardian in the receiving state.
1 2 3
Thus, an interstate placement made by a specified relative or a guard-
ian is beyond the reach of the ICPC if the recipient of the child is a
specified relative or a non-agency guardian. However, the individual
placing the child and the individual receiving the child must have one
of the specified relationships with the child. The only difference in
the specified relationships is that with respect to "guardians." Any
"guardian" may place a child, but only a "non-agency guardian" may
be a recipient. Presumably then, if an agency has been appointed
guardian, the agency may place the child in another state with a
grandparent without ICPC approval. However, a grandparent may
not place the child with an agency guardian in another state without
ICPC approval.
Neither "guardian" nor "non-agency guardian" is defined in the
ICPC. However, by regulation, the Association of Compact Adminis-
trators has delineated the characteristics that a parent, relative, or
guardian must possess in order to place a child without ICPC approval
pursuant to the Article VIII(a) exemption. Regulation III(c) provides:
Article VIII(a) of this Compact applies only to the sending or bringing of a
child into a receiving state to a parent or other specified individual by a parent
or other specified individual whose full legal right to plan for the child has
been established by law at a time prior to initiation of the placement arrange-
ment, and has not been voluntarily terminated, or diminished or severed by
the action or order of any Court.1 24
One court has concluded that the rationale for the standard im-
122. ICPC, supra note 1, at art. III(d).
123. ICPC, supra note 1, at art. VIII.
124. COMPACT ADMINISTRATORS' MANUAL, supra note 13, at 1.23 (Regulation
III(c))(emphasis added).
1989]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
posed by Regulation III on a guardian who places a child impels that
the same standard be applied to a non-agency guardian who receives a
child. In In re Adoption of Baby "E, "125 the court found that the pur-
pose of Regulation III was to ensure "that only one whose legal rela-
tionship towards the child has been independently and legitimately
established will have the right to effect such a drastic change as an
interstate placement without the oversight and supervision of the con-
tracting states."126 Therefore, according to the court, a non-agency
guardian who receives a child must possess the pre-existing right to
plan for the child.
The court's imposition of the same standard on guardians who "re-
ceive" as that imposed on guardians who "place" would appear to pre-
clude most placements that the Article VIII(a) exemption would
otherwise permit. In most cases only the individual or agency placing
the child will have a previously established right to plan for the child.
The individual receiving the child is likely to obtain the right to plan
for the child concurrently with the transfer of custody or subse-
quently, as in an adoption proceeding. The effect of the court's con-
struction of "non-agency guardian" in Baby "E" is to further narrow
the exemption of Article VIII(a) to so few circumstances that it be-
comes meaningless.
Although the facts of Baby "E" did not involve a placement with
relatives, the reasoning of the court leads to the conclusion that a
placement with any of the relatives named in Article VIII(a) would
require that the receiving relative have a prior right to plan for the
child. This conclusion is inescapable because Regulation III, upon
which the court relied, refers to "a parent or other specified individ-
ual" who sends or brings a child and is not limited to guardians.
Therefore, if Baby "E" were applied to a relative-to-relative place-
ment, ICPC approval would be required unless both relatives pos-
sessed the legal right to plan for the child-a most unlikely
circumstance. If the right to plan exists in one relative or guardian, it
is unlikely that it exists concurrently in another relative or guardian.
Ordinarily, the existence of the right to plan in one would negate the
existence of the right to plan in another. Exceptions would include
circumstances of shared responsibility, such as the coexistent rights of
parents or joint guardians.
An example of one of the few circumstances that would satisfy the
standards set out in Baby "E" would be a transfer of custody from one
parent to the other parent for purposes of a step-parent adoption,
where neither parent's rights have been diminished by a court. This
could occur if the child were born to an unmarried mother and a fa-
125. 104 Misc. 2d 185, 427 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Faro. Ct. 1980).
126. Id. at 190, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 709.
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ther married to a woman other than the mother. The mother could
bring or send the child from State A to the father in State B to permit
the child to be adopted by the father's wife without receiving ICPC
approval. Of course, this assumes that the father's paternity has been
established, as Regulation III requires that the "full legal right to plan
for the child [be] established by law" prior to placement. Neither the
language of Regulation III, nor that of Article VIII(a), requires that
the right to plan be established by court order - only "by law." Thus,
a question could arise as to which state's law should apply in determin-
ing whether a right to plan exists in the father.
Finally, a Secretariat Opinion that predates the promulgation of
Regulation III states that the purpose of the Article VIII(a) exemption
is:
to carve out a group of persons who so positively stand in a close familial or
equivalent relationship with the child that the arrangements made for care
and protection are obviously of a family character rather than of a kind in
which the public agencies and officials of the state should become
concerned. 12 7
However, neither the ICPC nor Regulation III requires an interpreta-
tion consistent with that purpose.
4. Placement Is Not Clearly Defined
An essential term to the interpretation and operation of the ICPC
is "placement." Unfortunately, placement is not clearly defined in the
ICPC, making it difficult to determine whether the ICPC applies to a
given situation. Placement is defined in Article II(d) as follows:
1 "Placement" means the arrangement for the care of a child in a family free
or boarding home or in a child-caring agency or institution but does not in-
clude any institution caring for the mentally ill, mentally defective or epilep-
tic or any institution primarily educational in character, and any hospital or
other medical facility.' 2 8
As noted in Section V(A) of this Article, neither "family free" nor
"boarding" is defined in the ICPC.129 Because the definition of place-
ment does not refer to adoption specifically, the question has been
posed whether the ICPC applies when a child is permitted to live with
prospective adoptive parents in another state. 30 Although that ques-
tion cannot be answered by reference to the definition alone, it can be
answered affirmatively by reading the definitional section together
with paragraph (a) of Article III, which requires ICPC approval for
127. COMPACT ADMINISTRATORs' MANUAL, supra note 13, at 3.75-3.76 (Secretariat
Opinion 39 (April 15, 1977)).
128. ICPC, supra note 1, at art. II(d).
129. See supra text accompanying note 36.
130. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Baby Boy W, 701 S.W.2d 534 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); In re
Adoption of M.M., 652 P.2d 974 (Wyo. 1982).
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"placement... preliminary to a possible adoption."131 Article III(a)
prohibits a sending agency from sending, bringing, or causing a child
to be sent or brought into another party state "for placement in foster
care or as a preliminary to a possible adoption" unless the provisions
of Article III and the child placement laws of the receiving state have
been met.13 2 Thus, reading the two sections together, the ICPC would
seem to apply when a child is permitted to live with prospective adop-
tive parents.133 This interpretation is supported by the legislative his-
tory of the ICPC.13 4 Of course, questions may still arise as to whether
a placement is "preliminary" or permanent, and as to whether an
adoption is "possible" or actual.
Just such a question was posed in In re Adoption of M.M,135 where
the Supreme Court of Wyoming held that "'placement' preliminary
to a 'possible' adoption" did not include the relinquishment of a child
by her natural mother to the adopting parents.136 The court stated
that "[t]he terminology [of the ICPC] lacks cohesion with and is not
adaptable to an adoption arranged privately between the consenting
natural parent and the adopting parents."137 In the court's view, the
mother's relinquishment could not be revoked under Wyoming law
absent a showing of fraud or duress;13s thus, it was "a positive, not [a]
potential act."139 However, this interpretation is at odds with the posi-
tion taken by other courts140 and the Secretariat,'41 all of which have
131. ICPC, supra note 1, at art. III(a).
132. ICPC, supra note 1, at art. III.
133. But see Leavitt, supra note 86, at 149 (ICPC intended to protect children in foster
care).
134. "The compact provides procedures for the interstate placement of children
(either by public agencies or by private persons or agencies) when such place-
ment is for foster care or as a preliminary to a possible adoption." COUNCIL OF
STATE GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION PROGRAM FOR 1961, 49
(1960). The Draftsman's Notes for the ICPC indicate that the definition of place-
ment in Article II was intended to exclude from ICPC placements arrangements
for temporary or specialized care, while including arrangements for the general
upbringing of children. R. HUNT, OBSTACLES TO INTERSTATE ADOPTION app. 44
(1972).
135. 652 P.2d 974 (Wyo. 1982).
136. Id. at 981.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 978.
139. Id. (The court attempted to distinguish relinquishment to an agency for the pur-
pose of adoption and relinquishment to adoptive parents directly).
140. See, e.g., In re Adoption of C.L.W., 467 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); In re
Adoption of Baby "E", 104 Misc. 2d 185, 427 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Fain. Ct. 1980).
141. See COMPACT ADMINISTRATORS' MANUAL, supra note 13, at 2.36 (Opinions of In-
terest). In a curious interpretation of In re Adoption of M.M., 652 P.2d 974 (Wyo.
1982), the assertion is made that the Wyoming court "applied the Compact to a
private placement." However, this conflicts with the language of the case: "We
hold the compact inapplicable." COMPACT ADMINISTRATORS' MANUAL, supra
note 13. at 2.39.
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concluded that the ICPC applies to an independent adoption.
The Association of Administrators has expanded the definition of
"placement" to include the circumstance of a move from one state to
another by the family after a child has been placed, but before the
adoption has been finalized. Regulation I provides that "an intrastate
placement not subject to the Compact may become an interstate place-
ment subject thereto if, at some subsequent time prior to the consum-
mation of the adoption. ., the home is moved to another state."142
Thus, in the view of the Secretariat and the Association of Adminis-
trators, the adoption is "possible" until it has been finalized.143
D. Compliance with Child Placement Laws of the Sending State Not
Specifically Required
Article III prescribes what must be done to effect a valid interstate
placement, and, as might be expected, it requires compliance with the
child placement laws of the receiving state;144 but nowhere does the
ICPC contain a parallel requirement of compliance with the child
placement laws of the sending state.145 This would suggest that the
child placement laws of the sending state need not be complied with to
have a &alid placement under the ICPC. The ICPC might then be in-
terpreted as encouraging the placement of children in violation of the
placement laws of the sending state or as repealing the placement laws
of the sending state in cases of interstate placement. Neither interpre-
tation reflects the likely intent of the ICPC.
The problem created by this lack of symmetry has become more
theoretical than practical. In usual practice, the compact administrator
in a receiving state is unlikely to approve a placement that is violative
of the sending state's laws. Most party states have enacted regulations
that require the involvement of the compact administrator in the
sending state before an ICPC placement request can be forwarded to
the receiving state.146 It is significant to note that without such regu-
lations, the involvement of the compact administrator in the sending
state would not be required, and the sending agency could forward an
ICPC placement request to the receiving state's compact office di-
rectly. Article III requires only that the sending agency provide notice
to, and obtain approval from, the compact administrator in the receiv-
142. COMPACr ADMINISTRATORS' MANUAL, supra note 13, at 1.20 (Regulation I).
143. It should be noted that Secretariat Opinion 1, which suggests that such a move
would not make the placement subject to the ICPC, has been overruled by Regu-
lation I. COMPAcT ADMINISTRATORS' MANUAL, supra note 13, at 3.2 n.1.
144. ICPC, supra note 1, at art. III(a).
145. As discussed in the text accompanying notes 119-22, the ICPC does not embrace
the concept of a sending state. "Sending state" is not defined in the ICPC and the
text of the ICPC does not include a role for the sending state.
146. COMPAcT ADMINISTRATORS' MANUAL, supra note 13, at 1.40 (Suggested Proce-
dures I(b)).
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ing state. If she deems it necessary, the compact administrator in the
receiving state may also request the involvement of the compact ad-
ministrator in the sending state for the purpose of providing more
information.147
Several reasons may exist for the apparent omission of compliance
with the laws of the sending state as a condition for placement. For
example, despite the inclusion of individuals and other entities in the
definition of sending agency, the ICPC was drafted as if the sending
agency would in fact be an agency or court, not an individual.148 Li-
censed child placing agencies and courts could reasonably be expected
to have knowledge of, and to comply with, the child placement laws in
their state. In the case of licensed agencies, the threat of the loss of
license could be expected to ensure a reasonable level of compliance.
Even so, individuals and other child placing entities may lack knowl-
edge of, or may not be inclined to comply with, the laws of the sending
state without a more specific directive.
The Secretariat has provided such a specific directive by taking the
position that the ICPC requires compliance with the laws of the send-
ing state.149 The Secretariat apparently relies on Article III(b)(4),
which requires that the notice submitted to the compact administrator
in the receiving state include "evidence of the authority pursuant to
which the placement is proposed to be made,"150 and Article IV, which
provides that violation of the compact is deemed a violation of the
child placement laws in both the receiving state and the sending
state. 5 1
The requirement of Article III(b)(4) that the sending agency pro-
vide "evidence of authority" to make the proposed placement is sus-
ceptible to at least two interpretations. First, it may be interpreted to
require evidence that the placement is authorized by the laws of both
the sending and receiving states. This construction is consistent with
the position of the Secretariat. 5 2 Second, it may be interpreted to re-
quire evidence that the placement is authorized only by the laws of
the receiving state. This construction is consistent with the position
147. ICPC, supra note 1, at art. III(c).
148. See, e.g., COMPACT ADMINISTRATORS' MANUAL, supra note 13, at 1.40 (Suggested
Procedures I(b)) ("A person intending to place a child in another compact state
will necessarily enlist the help of an agency or court in the sending
state.")(emphasis added).
149. See COMPACT ADMINISTRATORS' MANUAL, supra note 13, at 3.67 (Secretariat
Opinion 37 (April 7, 1977)). See also COMPACT ADMINISTRATORS' MANUAL, supra
note 13, at 2.2-2.3 (Compact Provisions, An Interpretive Commentary).
150. ICPC, supra note 1, at art. III(b)(4).
151. ICPC, supra note 1, at art. IV.
152. See COMPACT ADMINIsTRAToRs' MANUAL, supra note 13, at 3.67 (Secretariat
Opinion 37 (April 7, 1977)).
[Vol. 68:292
INTERSTATE COMPACT
taken by courts in several reported cases.153
In In re Male Child Born July 15, 1985 to L.C.,154 a child born in
Montana was relinquished by his mother in Montana to an Idaho
adoption agency for placement with an Idaho family. Because the
mother desired immediate placement of the child with the adoptive
family, the child was placed after ICPC approval was sought, but
before it was granted. Three days after the placement, when the child
was six days old, the mother changed her mind and sought to compel
his return. While the mother was pursuing her action to revoke her
consent in the Montana courts, ICPC approval was granted in Idaho,
and the adoption was finalized there.
In her appeal of the trial court's decision denying her petition, the
mother argued that the adoption agency's failure to secure a judicial
termination of her parental rights before placing the child for adop-
tion, as required by Montana law, rendered the placement illegal. In
rejecting that argument, the court held that inasmuch as Idaho law
required only parental consent to the adoption, the adoption agency
'"ad authority to place the child in Idaho under Article V of the Com-
pact," and the adoption in Idaho was proper.1 55 Thus, failure to com-
ply with the child placement laws of the sending state did not affect
the right of the sending agency under the ICPC to place the child in
accordance with the laws of the receiving state.
Article IV discloses even less support for the Secretariat's position
than Article III(b)(4). Article IV addresses the issue of penalty for an
ICPC violation, not the threshold issue of what constitutes a violation
of the ICPC. Therefore, the effect of Article IV is not to engraft the
law of the sending state onto the compact in the same manner that
Article III engrafts the law of the receiving state. Instead, Article IV
outlines, in general terms, the nature of the penalty that will result if
the ICPC is violated, and provides that the violation may be punished
in either state in the same manner as if there had been a violation of a
child placement law in that state. For example, if a child were sent
from State A to State B by X, and X failed to comply with the ICPC, X
could be punished for the violation according to the child placement
laws of either jurisdiction. On the other hand, if X had complied with
Article III in making the placement (i.e., had sought and received the
approval of State B prior to placement and had complied with the
child placement laws of State B), Article IV would have no effect.
153. See In re Male Child Born July 15, 1985 to L.C., 718 P.2d 660 (Mont. 1986). Cf In
re Adoption of Baby Boy, M.G., Anonymous, 135 Misc. 2d 252,254-55,515 N.Y.S.2d
198, 199, 201 (Sur. Ct. 1987)(sending state compact administrator withheld ap-
proval as violative of the sending state's laws, but a court in the sending state had
given permission for removal of child to the receiving state).
154. 718 P.2d 660 (Mont. 1986).
155. Id. at 664-65.
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This is true regardless of whether the placement violated State A's
laws. Because the approval of the receiving state was obtained, it is
not the ICPC, but some other provision of State A's child placement
laws that would have been violated. Of course, X could be punished in
State A for that violation, but not in State B unless State B, by statute
other than the ICPC or by regulation, required compliance with State
A's laws as a condition of placement.
Clearly, while the ICPC was designed to facilitate interstate place-
ments, it was not intended to facilitate the evasion of a sending state's
laws. In some instances the ICPC does override provisions of a state's
laws;156 however, it does so explicitly and for reasons that are consis-
tent with the purpose of the ICPC. While the practical problem of
noncompliance with the sending state's laws may have been overcome
by regulation, the regulations need not be adopted in all states and
need not be uniform in their content. Therefore, it would have been
preferable for the ICPC to require definitively that the sending agency
comply with the applicable laws of both the sending state and the re-
ceiving state.
D. Sanctions for Failure to Comply with ICPC are Inadequate to
Discourage Violation
While the ICPC does not detail specific sanctions for noncompli-
ance, except the suspension or revocation of the sending agency's li-
cense,15 7 it does, as discussed above, provide that violation of its terms
constitutes violation of the child placement laws of both the sending
state and the receiving state. 5 8 Accordingly, the violation may subject
the sending agency to prosecution in either state, and the sanctions
that may be imposed are the same as those available for illegal child
placement in that state.1 59 In most states, a violation of child place-
ment laws is a misdemeanor,60 but in a few states, such a violation is a
felony.161
The failure of the ICPC to specify sanctions other than the loss of a
sending agency's license has prompted speculation that the intended
scope of the ICPC is limited to child placing agencies.1 6 2 While the
156. For example, a receiving state's jurisdiction over a child is limited by Article V,
which provides for the retention of jurisdiction by the sending agency. See supra
text accompanying note 45.
157. ICPC, supra note 1, at art. IV.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. E.g., ALA. CODE § 38-7-16 (1975); A.AsIKA STAT. § 47.70:070 (1962); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 26-6-112 (1973); IDAHO CODE § 39-1220 (1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 3800 (1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 245.803 (1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 127.310
(1986).
161. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 63.212 (1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-19 (1982).
162. See, e.g., In re Adoption of M.M., 652 P.2d 974, 981 (Wyo. 1982)(on the basis of the
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Article II definition of "sending agency" and the potential for criminal
sanctions caution against limiting the application of the ICPC to public
and private child placing agencies, the absence of other specified sanc-
tions supports the view that those agencies comprise the group at
which the ICPC is directed.16 3 When this view influences a sending
agency's decision of whether to seek ICPC approval, or worse, controls
a court's enforcement of ICPC provisions, the ICPC is rendered far
less effective.
Perhaps the more unfortunate result of the failure to either specify
or rule out other sanctions has been the confusion in the courts as to
whether violation of the ICPC should result in the denial of a petition
to adopt. Because the ICPC is silent on the precise issue, the courts
have developed various approaches and reached conflicting results in
analyzing this problem. As a consequence, the ICPC goals of certainty
and uniformity have been hindered. The predicament which the
courts face is whether to allow the best interests of the child standard
to conttol when the ICPC has been violated. If the best interests stan-
dard controls, then the adoption may be granted despite violation of
the ICPC. Alternatively, ff the violation of the ICPC is fatal to an
otherwise desirable adoption, then a child may be deprived of the only
family he has ever known, returned to a natural parent who is margin-
ally capable of providing adequate care, or placed in foster care to
await an uncertain future. Undoubtedly, it is the potentially harsh re-
sult, contrary to the best interests of the child, that has caused the
compact administrators, the Secretariat, and the courts to counte-
nance retroactive compliance with the ICPC and, where that is not
possible, finalization of adoptions despite noncompliance. Moreover,
the circularity of the problem is evident: both retroactive compliance
and finalization of adoptions despite ICPC violations encourage subse-
quent violations. In at least one jurisdiction, the courts have devel-
oped what may prove to be an effective remedy-the denial or
reduction of attorney fees when the ICPC has been violated.164
In only one reported case has a violation of the ICPC blocked final-
ization of the adoption. In In re Adoption of T.MM. ,165 the Supreme
Court of Montana held that an adoption placement made in violation
available sanctions, the court concluded that the ICPC "is applicable only to those
engaged in the governmental or private service of placing children for adop-
tion."). But see In re Adoption of C.L.W.. 467 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985); In re Adoption of Baby "E," 104 Misc. 2d 185, 427 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Fam. Ct.
1980).
163. But see Matter of Adoption of T.M.M., 186 Mont. 460, 608 P.2d 130 (1980), dis-
cussed infra at notes 165-171.
164. See In re Adoption of Calynn, M.G., An Infant,' 137 Misc. 2d 1005, 1008, 523
N.Y.S.2d 729, 731 (Sur. Ct. 1987)(attorney fees feduced from $2664 to $1500 for
violation of ICPC and rules of court).
165. 186 Mont. 460, 608 P.2d 130 (1980).
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of the ICPC was an illegal placement, the sanction for which was the
revocation of the natural mother's consent and the return of the child
to the natural mother. 6 6 The court noted that Article IV provides for
the penalty of "suspension or revocation of any license, permit, or
other legal authorization held by the sending agency which empowers
or allows it to place or care for children." 6 7 From this the court rea-
soned that the prospective adoptive parents were the sending agency
and that the mother's consent was the legal authorization held by the
sending agency, within the meaning of Article IV. Consent having
been revoked, the adoption proceeding was dismissed. The court re-
jected the prospective adoptive parents' argument that, although the
"technical procedures" of the ICPC were not followed, they had "ac-
ted in the best interests of the child" and should be permitted to
adopt.168
The starting point of the court's analysis in TM.M. was the follow-
ing language in Article IV: "In addition to liability [for violation of the
child placement laws], any such violation shall constitute full and suf-
ficient grounds for the suspension or revocation of any license, permit,
or other legal authorization held by the sending agency which empow-
ers or allows it to place, or care for children."169 The court interpreted
this language to mean that the violation of the ICPC, which occurred
when the child was brought into the state without the approval of the
ICPC administrator, established grounds for the revocation of the
mother's consent to the adoption. The mother's consent, according to
the court, was the legal authorization which allowed the prospective
adoptive parents "to place" the child, that is, to bring the child into
their home for purposes of adoption.
By implication, the court rejected the argument that the language
in Article IV should be limited to agencies and other third party in-
termediaries who are licensed or authorized by the state to place "chil-
dren" generally and that such language should not be extended to
prospective adoptive parents for whom the mother's consent autho-
rizes only their adoption of a specific child. In this regard, the court's
interpretation of this portion of Article IV appears broader than,
though not necessarily in conflict with, that of the Secretariat. The
Secretariat's interpretation does not mention the possible extension of
the revocation language to consent executed in favor of unlicensed in-
dividuals; it focuses exclusively on the suspension or revocation of the
license of an agency by the licensing state.170
166. Id.
167. ICPC, supra note 1, at art. IV.
168. In re Adoption of T.M.M., 186 Mont. 460, 463, 608 P.2d 130, 132 (1980).
169. ICPC, supra note 1, at art. IV (emphasis added).
170. Since the Compact becomes part of the law in each party state, the lan-
guage of this Article makes interstate placement contrary to Compact
requirements unlawful. This is important of [sic] itself because many
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It may be more instructive to consider what T.M.M did not hold,
rather than what it held. It did not hold that dismissal of the petition
to adopt was an appropriate remedy for violation of the ICPC. The
petition to adopt was dismissed as the indirect result of the ICPC vio-
lation; the remedy for the ICPC violation was the revocation of the
mother's consent. Thus, while T.M. is the only one of the cases in
which the adoption was blocked, it is also the only one of the cases in
which the issue of ICPC noncompliance was reached at a procedural
juncture where the best interests standard was not considered.171
Unlike four other cases dealing with the possible denial of an adop-
tion petition for noncompliance with the ICPC, T.M.M involved a
child who was five years old at the time of placement and was seven
years old when the case was decided. All of the other cases involved
children who had been in their adoptive homes since early infancy,
and whose adoptive parents were the only parents they had ever
known.
The court in T.M. apparently rejected or failed to consider the
argument that the mother, like the adoptive parents, was a sending
agency charged with the responsibility of complying with the ICPC.
However, that argument was persuasive to the Florida Court of Ap-
peals in In re Adoption of C.L. W172 In a per curiam opinion, the court
affirmed a trial court decision finalizing the adoption of a child over
the objection of the natural mother who had revoked her consent to
the adoption, and who had obtained a decree awarding her custody of
the child in Pennsylvania.73 The child had been relinquished by the
mother to the adoptive parents in Pennsylvania soon after birth. The
mother then changed her mind, but the child was brought by the
persons and agencies will avoid conduct merely because it is unlawful. Afurther question relates to affirmative action to punish violators. If the
violator is a licensed child placing or child caring agency, the explicit
reference to suspension or revocation of licenses makes it possible that
such a penalty may be imposed by the licensing authority or by whatever
procedures are appropriate in the licensing state. It is a general princi-
ple of law that only the jurisdiction which issues a license may suspend
or revoke. Consequently this remedy cannot be applied in any state
other than the state which has issued the license. What other specific
penalties are applicable at any given time depends on whether the laws
of a party state provide any....
COMPACr ADMINISTRATORS' MANUAL, supra note 13, at 2.3-2.4 (Compact Provi-
sions, An Interpretive Commentary)(emphasis added).
171. In other contexts not involving the ICPC, some courts have considered the best
interests standard to be controlling, despite the invalidity of parental consent.
See, e.g., Lemly v. Barr, 343 S.E.2d 101 (W. Va. 1986).
172. 467 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
173. The mother's efforts to have the Pennsylvania custody award enforced in Florida
under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act were unsuccessful, both in a
Florida habeas corpus proceeding and in the instant adoption proceeding. Id. at
1108-10.
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adoptive parents to Florida, their domicile, where an adoption was
sought. In objecting to the proposed adoption, the mother asserted
that because the ICPC had been violated, the petition to adopt should
be denied. The trial court found that the ICPC did not apply. The
Florida Court of Appeals- disagreed with the trial court, concluding
that the ICPC had been violated, but that "no harm was suffered by
the failure to comply" with the ICPC. Therefore, the court concluded
that "the compact [was] not available to nullify the adoption proceed-
ings."174 The court noted that the same kind of investigation had been
completed as would have been required under the ICPC, and that the
state agency charged with responsibility of administering the compact
was not complaining, having found that. the adoption would not be
contrary to the best interests of the child.175 "Further, [the mother],
as well as [the adoptive parents], had a duty as a 'sending agency'
under the compact to notify [the compact administrator] and she
should not now be allowed to complain of such failure by the [adoptive
parents] to do so."176
Three other cases dealing with the possible denial of an adoption
petition for noncompliance with the ICPC are reported from New
York, where the courts are showing increased dissatisfaction with at-
torneys who fail to observe the requirements of the ICPC when repre-
senting clients in private adoptions. Unlike T.M.M and C.L. W, the
New York cases did not involve opposition to the adoption by the birth
mother. All of the New York cases were reported at the trial court
level and there are no reported appeals of those decisions. The New
York cases may provide a good indication of how courts are attempting
to grapple with both ICPC noncompliance and the best interests of the
children.
The earliest of the three New York cases, In re Adoption of Baby
"E," was decided in 1980 and was the first reported case to consider
"what court action is appropriate on an adoption petition in which an
interstate placement does not comply with the [ICPC] . . .but the
child, now three years old, has lived all his life in an adoptive home
that clearly meets his best interests."17 7 The court concluded that the
best interests of the child should prevail when the "essential ingredi-
ents of a sound adoption have been met" and when "only the failure to
comply" with the ICPC, or possible attorney misconduct, stands in the
way of the adoption.178 In arriving at this conclusion, the court noted
its duty to the party states of the ICPC to uphold the law, but recog-
174. Id. at 1111.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. In re Adoption of Baby "E," 104 Misc. 2d 185, 186, 427 N.Y.S.2d 705, 706 (Farn. Ct.
1980).
178. Id. at 186, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 709.
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nized its paramount duty as that of parens patriae to protect the best
interests of the child.179
Following the same line of reasoning as the court in Baby"E," the
court in In re Adoption of Baby Boy M.G., Anonymous granted a peti-
tion for adoption where ICPC approval was sought, but denied by the
compact administrators of both the sending and receiving states, Ten-
nessee and New York, respectively. 8 0 The basis for the denial of com-
pact approval by the compact administrator in Tennessee was a
Tennessee law, since changed, which prohibited third party place-
ments. His refusal then formed the basis for the refusal of his New
York counterpart. Both compact administrators maintained their po-
sitions despite the fact that both the natural mother and the adoptive
parents appeared before a Tennessee court and obtained court permis-
sion to remove the child from Tennessee. After concluding that the
court permission in Tennessee did not confer guardianship status on
the adoptive parents within the meaning of the Article VIII exemp-
tion, the court concluded that the substantial compliance with the
ICPC, coupled with the best interests of the child, warranted granting
the adoption petition.
The third New York case, In re Adoption of Calynn, M.G., also in-
volved a placement from Tennessee without ICPC approval.s1 When
the petitioners' attorney was directed by the court to seek approval by
serving a citation on the New York compact administrator, the re-
sponse from the New York compact administrator asserted the belief,
based on past contacts with the attorney over a period of several years,
that the attorney had knowingly disregarded the ICPC. Once again,
the best interests of the child prevailed. The court noted the uncer-
tainty that would result for the child if the adoption were not final-
ized, because the whereabouts of the natural mother was then
unknown and the child had been in the custody of the petitioners. 8 2
After expressing concern about "repeated circumvention," the court
republished guidelines for private adoptions first published in Baby
"E." The court stated that "[flailure to adhere to these rules or those
[of the ICPC] may result in a petition for adoption being rejected, the
denial or reduction of the attorney's fee, or civil or criminal sanctions
as may be appropriate." 8 3 The court then reduced the attorney's fees
from $2,664 to $1500, as a sanction for failure to comply with the court
rules and the ICPC.
179. Id. at 193, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 711.
180. In re Adoption of Baby Boy M.G., Anonymous, 135 Misc. 2d 252, 515 N.Y.S.2d 198
(Sur. Ct. 1987).
181. In re Adoption of Calynn, M.G., 137 Misc. 2d 1005, 523 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sur. Ct.
1987).
182. Id. at 1006, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 730.
183. Id. at 1007, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 731.
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The imposition of sanctions against attorneys who violate the ICPC
may be the most effective and fairest way to enforce the ICPC and
encourage compliance with its terms, especially in cases where the
adoption is otherwise desirable and there is no objection from the
birth parent. The innocent child would continue to be protected by
the best interests standard, and the expectations of the adoptive and
birth parents would be given effect.
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The ICPC would better accomplish its mission if it were widely
known. Where practicable, adoption statutes should cross-reference
the ICPC. At the least, the indices to state statutes should cross-refer-
ence the ICPC under "adoption" and "interstate adoption." Efforts
should be made to inform thebench and bar of the existence of the
ICPC and of its provisions through continuing legal education publica-
tions and programs and practice oriented publications.
The definitional section of the ICPC might be improved to remove
ambiguities in the definitions of "sending agency" and "placement." A
hierarchy of sending agencies might be created to fix responsibility for
ICPC compliance. "Guardian" and "non-agency guardian" should be
defined. The concept of "sending state" ought to be incorporated into
the ICPC, as should the requirement that the laws of both the sending
and receiving states be followed.
Some consideration should be given to developing different proce-
dures for differing kinds of placements. A system of notice to the
compact administrators in adoptive placements, followed by an inves-
tigation and a report, might eliminate unnecessary delays while pro-
viding equivalent protection to children. To the extent that delays can
be avoided, one of the greatest incentives for noncompliance would be
removed.
Finally, more effective sanctions should be developed to enforce
the ICPC without penalizing innocent children and families. The im-
position of sanctions against attorneys who fail to comply with the
ICPC should be included as a possible penalty. The question of
whether an adoption petition should be denied for failure to comply
with the ICPC ought to be addressed in the ICPC to ensure uniformity
from state to state.
The laudable goal of maximizing available information for in-
formed decisionmaking before an adoption placement occurs cannot
be permitted to overshadow the ultimate goal of facilitating desirable
interstate adoption placements. The functions of information gather-
ing and dissemination are important only to the degree that they en-
hance the decisionmaking process and thereby improve the quality of
life for children. They are not ends unto themselves. Bearing that in
mind, the ICPC and its implementation ought to be reconsidered from
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the perspective of whether it facilitates, unnecessarily delays, or frus-
trates desirable placements.
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APPENDIX
INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT
OF CHILDREN
ARTICLE I. Purpose and Policy
It is the purpose and policy of the party states to cooperate with
each other in the interstate placement of children to the end that:
(a) Each child requiring placement shall receive the maximum
opportunity to be placed in a suitable environment and with persons
or institutions having appropriate qualifications and facilities to pro-
vide a necessary and desirable degree and type of care.
(b) The appropriate authorities in a state where a child is to be
placed may have full opportunity to ascertain the circumstances of the
proposed placement, thereby promoting full compliance with applica-
ble requirements for the protection of the child.
(c) The proper authorities of the state from which the placement
is made may obtain the most complete information on the basis of
which to evaluate a projected placement before it is made.
(d) Appropriate jurisdictional arrangements for the care of chil-
dren will be promoted.
ARTICLE II. Definitions
As used in this compact:
(a) "Child" means a person who, by reason of minority, is legally
subject to parental, guardianship or similar control.
(b) "Sending agency" means a party state, officer or employee
thereof; a subdivision of a party state, or officer or employee thereof; a
court of a party state; a person, corporation, association, charitable
agency or other entity which sends, brings, or causes to be sent or
brought any child to another party state.
(c) "Receiving state" means the state to which a child is sent,
brought, or caused to be sent or brought, whether by public authorities
or private persons or agencies, and whether for placement with pri-
vate agencies or persons.
(d) "Placement" means the arrangement for the care of a child in
a family free or boarding home or in a child-caring agency or institu-
tion but does not include any institution caring for the mentally ill,
mentally defective or epileptic or any institution primarily educational
in character, and any hospital or other medical facility.
ARTICLE Il. Conditions for Placement
(a) No sending agency shall send, bring, or cause to be sent or
brought into any other party state any child for placement in foster
care or as a preliminary to a possible adoption unless the sending
agency shall comply with each and every requirement set forth in this
article and with the applicable laws of the receiving state governing
the placement of children therein.
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(b) Prior to sending, bringing or causing any child to be sent or
brought into a receiving state for placement in foster care or as a pre-
liminary to a possible adoption, the sending agency shall furnish the
appropriate public authorities in the receiving state written notice of
the intention to send, bring, or place the child in the receiving state.
The notice shall contain:
(1) The name, date and place of birth of the child.
(2) The identity and address or addresses of the parents or legal
guardian.
(3) The name and address of the person, agency or institution to
or with which the sending agency proposes to send, bring, or place the
child.
(4) A full statement of the reasons for such proposed action and
evidence of the authority pursuant to which the placement is proposed
to be made.
(c) Any public officer or agency in a receiving state which is in
receipt of a notice pursuant to paragraph (b) of this article may re-
quest of the sending agency, or any other appropriate officer or agency
of or in the sending agency's state, and shall be entitled to receive
therefrom, such supporting or additional information as it may deem
necessary under the circumstances to carry out the purpose and policy
of this compact.
(d) The child shall not be sent, brought, or caused to be sent or
brought into the receiving state until the appropriate public authori-
ties in the receiving state shall notify the sending agency, in writing, to
the effect that the proposed placement does not appear to be contrary
to the interests of the child.
ARTICLE IV. Penalty for Illegal Placement
The sending, bringing, or causing to be sent or brought into any
receiving state of a child in violation of the terms of this compact shall
constitute a violation of the laws respecting the placement of children
of both the state in which the sending agency is located or from which
it sends or brings the child and of the receiving state. Such violation
may be punished or subjected to penalty in either jurisdiction in ac-
cordance with its laws. In addition to liability for any such punish-
ment or penalty, any such violation shall constitute full and sufficient
grounds for the suspension or revocation of any license, permit, or
other legal authorization held by the sending agency which empowers
or allows it to place, or care for children.
ARTICLE V. Retention of Jurisdiction
(a) The sending agency shall retain jurisdiction over the child
sufficient to determine all matters in relation to the custody, supervi-
sion, care, treatment and disposition of the child which it would have
had if the child had remained in the sending agency's state, until the
child is adopted, reaches majority, becomes self-supporting or is dis-
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charged with the concurrence of the appropriate authority in the re-
ceiving state. Such jurisdiction shall also include the power to effect
or cause the return of the child or its transfer to another location and
custody pursuant to law. The sending agency shall continue to have
financial responsibility for support and maintenance of the child dur-
ing the period of the placement. Nothing contained herein shall de-
feat a claim of jurisdiction by a receiving state sufficient to deal with
an act of delinquency or crime committed therein.
(b) When the sending agency is a public agency, it may enter into
an agreement with an authorized public or private agency in the re-
ceiving state pioviding for the performance of one or more services in
respect of such case by the latter as agent for the sending agency.
(c) Nothing in this compact shall be construed to prevent a pri-
vate charitable agency authorized to place children in the receiving
state from performing services or acting agent in that state for a pri-
vate charitable agency of the sending state; nor to prevent the agency
in the receiving state from discharging financial responsibility for the
support and maintenance of a child who has been placed on behalf of
the sending agency without relieving the responsibility set forth in
paragraph (a) hereof.
ARTICLE VI. Institutional Care of Delinquent Children
A child adjudicated delinquent may be placed in an institution in
another party jurisdiction pursuant to this compact but no such place-
ment shall be made unless the child is given a court hearing on notice
to the parent or guardian with opportunity to be heard, prior to his
being sent to such other party jurisdiction for institutional care and
the court finds that:
1. Equivalent facilities for the child are not available in the send-
ing agency's jurisdiction; and
2. Institutional care in the other jurisdiction is in the best interest
of the child and will not produce undue hardship.
ARTICLE VII. Compact Administrator
The executive head of each jurisdiction party to this compact shall
designate an officer who shall be general coordinator of activities
under this compact in his jurisdiction and who, acting jointly with like
officers of other party jurisdictions, shall have power to promulgate
rules and regulations to carry out more effectively the terms and pro-
visions of this compact.
ARTICLE VIII. Limitations
This compact shall not apply to:
(a) The sending or bringing of a child into a receiving state by his
parent, step-parent, grandparent, adult brother or sister, adult uncle
or aunt, or his guardian and leaving the child with any such relative or
non-agency guardian in the receiving state.
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(b) Any placement, sending or bringing of a child into a receiving
state pursuant to any other interstate compact to which both the state
from which the child is sent or brought and the receiving state are
party, or to any other agreement between said states which has the
force of law.
ARTICLE IX. Enactment and Withdrawal
This compact shall be open to joinder by any state, territory or pos-
session of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico, and, with the consent of Congress, the
Government of Canada or any province thereof. It shall become effec-
tive with respect to any such jurisdiction when such jurisdiction has
enacted the same into law. Withdrawal from this compact shall be by
the enactment of a statute repealing the same, but shall not take effect
until two years after the effective date of such statute and until writ-
ten notice of the withdrawal has been given by the withdrawing state
to the Governor of each other party jurisdiction. Withdrawal of a
party state shall not affect the rights, duties and obligations under this
compact of any sending agency therein with respect to a placement
made prior to the effective date of withdrawal.
ARTICLE X Construction and Severability
The provisions of this compact shall be liberally construed to effec-
tuate the purposes thereof. The provisions of this compact shall be
severable and if any phrase, clause, sentence or provision of this com-
pact is declared to be contrary to the constitution of any party state or
of the United States or the applicability thereof to any government,
agency, person or circumstance is held invalid, the validity of the re-
mainder of this compact and the applicability thereof to any govern-
ment, agency, person or circumstance shall not be effected thereby. If
this compact shall be held contrary to the constitution of any state
party thereto, the compact shall remain in full force and effect as to
the remaining states and in full force and effect as to the state affected
as to all severable matters.
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